. We also would like to thank for their comments and suggestions on previous drafts of the paper the editors and reviewers of EJIR. Earlier drafts of the paper were Constructivism's western-centrism tends to overlook that the international sphere is replete with normative contestation. 6 The international sphere is, in fact, inhabited by a wide variety of non-western actors and norm entrepreneurs that are not solely norm-takers, but also active norm-makers, seeking to promote and internationalize their own beliefs, values and principles. This normative competition and complexity is becoming all the more apparent as world politics turns increasingly multipolar, as well as post-western (Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Kupchan, 2013; Tickner and Waever, 2009; Weber and Jentleson, 2010; Zakaria, 2011) .
to advance this emerging scholarly research by exploring the processes through which non-western actors promote norms within the structures of the 'liberal international order ' (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999; Ikenberry, 2009) . In other words, we flip the coin and investigate norm diffusion from a non-western periphery to a western core, and by non-western norm-makers to western norm-takers.
It is possible to think of several non-western agents and norms that interact with the actors and norms of the liberal order. We focus on religious-based norms promoted by actors anchored to an Islamic tradition in the context of global governance institutions such as the United Nations (UN). A focus on political Islam is warranted for a number of reasons. We believe that what Fiona Adamson (2005: 565) pointed to as the 'relative silence' in mainstream Constructivist research on political Islam still largely stands. This neglect is also particularly egregious since concerns about the role of Islam and Islamists of all strides have dominated international relations practices and debates for over a decade.
The paper contends that non-western religious-based actors have the greatest opportunity to diffuse their norms, within the institutions of the liberal international order, when their norms become intelligible from a secular, liberal, normative perspective through a successful process of institutional translation. When using the concept of translation to explore the dynamics of norm diffusion across different institutional and cultural contexts -in particular between a religious-Islamic and a secular-liberal context -we draw from debates on the 'post-secular', spearheaded by Jürgen Habermas 8 (2008; Habermas and Mendieta, 2010; Habermas et al., 2010) . In particular we refer to Habermas' institutional translation proviso, which requires that religious idioms be translated into universally acceptable secular language not at the source but when entering the formal legislative, executive and judicial deliberations of the state.
We contend that much of the learning and deliberative process between secular and religious actors that, for Habermas, should take place in post-secular liberal domestic settings, does, in many respects, already occur in the global public sphere. We are in a post-secular world society. Thus, the Habermasian concept of institutional translation can be understood not solely as a normative requirement for religious arguments to be included in the political deliberations of secular institutions, but also as an analytical causal mechanism, 9 through which norms that do not originate from a liberal tradition are diffused in liberal international settings and within secular global governance institutions. 10 We define institutional translation as the process of normative transmission between differently situated international actors, whose principles originate from diverse cultural and ethical backgrounds, whether these are religious, secular, national, ethnic or cultural. 11 Within this process, the norms' meaning is contested and negotiated and, when translation is successful, it establishes an open hermeneutic margin for its interpretation. This requires, to borrow the language of Michael Walzer (1994: x) , 'thinning' a 'thick' culturally embedded particularist norm. 12 A successful translation will converge towards a norm that transcends particularism, and hence enjoys legitimacy beyond the context in which it originated. The open hermeneutic margin of the translated norm provides it with a higher degree of vagueness and malleability, which facilitates agreement between promoters and receivers over the meaning and legitimacy of the norm, even if the parties differ over its ethical justification. That is, the process of translation allows for the possibility that, while a norm entrepreneur uses one language and set of meanings rooted in a particular cultural milieu, the receiving agents, when and if they become socialised in the new norm, internalise it in their own semantics and knowledge structures. 13 We build on an emerging interest within constructivist scholarship in processes and mechanisms of norm 'translation' (Boesenecker and Vinjamuri, 2011; Brake and Katzenstein, 2013; Zwingel, 2012) . More specifically, we seek to contribute to the development of what can be described as a third wave of research on the cross-cultural dynamics of norm diffusion. First wave scholarship generally portrays non-western actors as norm-takers. These are socialized and 'converted', thanks to the 'persuasive' power of the 'better argument' or the 'better norm', into the structure of meaning of the entrepreneurial, liberal, western-based norm-maker.
14 Second wave scholarship has been more sensitive to non-western agency and processes of cross-cultural normative contestation and re-interpretation. Yet, nonwesterners are still largely seen here as norm-takers -albeit as active 'mimickers' (Katsumata, 2011) , 'localizers' (Acharya, 2004) , and 'vernacularizers' (Merry, 2006; Levitt and Merry, 2009 ) -and rarely appear as norm-makers.
By highlighting the mechanism of institutional translation we seek to open up the study of norm dynamics beyond centre-periphery diffusion, still present in notions such as vernacularization or localization for instance. Translation subsumes localization, but also includes de-localization, a process in which particular nonwestern norms are diffused and non-western agents become norm-makers in world politics. Moreover, compared to unidirectional processes of persuasion, institutional translation opens the study of normative dynamics by considering the active role of western and non-western culturally-situated agency in dialogical dynamics of norm contestation.
The mechanism of institutional translation is illustrated empirically through two case studies on the normative activity of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). We concentrate on two norms that the OIC has sought to promote within the UN, with varying degrees of success, since the late 1990s: the dialogue of civilisations and the defamation of religion. These cases are not intended to be exhaustive, but to shed some light on norm diffusion through processes of institutional translation in at least two ways. First, they exemplify the promotion, by non-western norm-makers, of norms that originate outside the liberal tradition.
Second, their contrasting outcomes show the value of institutional translation in explaining how religious norms, and more generally non-western norms, diffuse in global settings. We argue that the diffusion of the dialogue of civilisations was the result of the successful institutional translation of the norm from its original Islamic formulation into a principle embraced also by non-OIC states. The non-diffusion of religious defamation was due in large part to the barriers faced in translating the norm into a more universally acceptable idiom, hence failing to garner widespread support.
Non-western agency, religious norms, and the limits of

Constructivist research
Spearheaded by Constructivist scholars, the empirical and theoretical investigation into the causes and consequences of norm diffusion in international society has become a thriving research program in IR. This literature concentrates mostly on certain types of norm dynamics. In particular the dynamics of liberal, cosmopolitan, secular norms -whether human rights, gender rights, international law, good governance, and so on -that are promoted, in international and local nonwestern contexts, by norm-makers largely of western origin, or closely tied to the structures of the western-based liberal international order.
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This focus, we argue, is the outcome of an implicit western-centrism present in much IR theory. 16 This bias, when it comes to Constructivist research on norm dynamics, is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it underpins a narrow research agenda, which overlooks the variety of non-western norm entrepreneurs populating the international sphere and seeking to promote their own values. Second, because it appears tied largely to a view of world politics anchored to the 'unipolar moment' (Krauthammer, 1990 ) -indirectly playing into triumphalist 'end of history' narratives (Fukuyama, 2006) -at a time when the international is increasingly becoming multipolar as well as post-western (Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Kupchan, 2013; Weber and Jentleson, 2010; Zakaria, 2011) .
What is generally called the resurgence of religion and the post-secular turn in the social world and scholarly thinking are an underexplored resource for broadening research on international change and norm dynamics beyond Constructivism's current western-centrism. There are, for instance, an emerging number of alternative conceptions on how to structure domestic and international orders drawing on religion: the spread of Jihadi ideology and movements (Mendelsohn, 2012) ; the diffusion of Sharia Courts in the UK (Jucan and Georgia, 2011) ; the turn towards Confucian values as an instrument of Chinese soft power (Paradise, 2009) ; the revaluation and growth in faith-based approaches to poverty reduction and development (Clarke, 2007) ; the articulation of transnational Muslim or Sikh identities and political projects (Shani, 2008) ; and the diffusion of Islamic finance (Lai, 2013) .
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Literature on religion in IR has expanded substantially over the past decade. A central debate here has revolved around the degree of change in international relations, as a practice and body of knowledge, brought about by religion's resurgence. On the one hand, some argue that religion's return has the potential to bring about profound international transformations, compelling scholars to abandon old paradigms and radically rethink the premises of IR theory, especially its positivist and secularist foundations (Hanson, 2006; Hatzopoulos and Petito, 2003b; Kubálková, 2003; Wilson, 2012 ; for a critique see Bellin, 2008) . On the other hand, some suggest instead that, while the turn to the sacred does present important challenges for IR, religion can nevertheless be absorbed into IR's main theoretical paradigms with only minor adjustments (Nexon, 2011; Sandal and Fox, 2013; Sandal and James, 2010; Snyder, 2011 ; for a critique see Kubálková, 2013) .
In practice, however, the above divisions become somewhat blurry. In fact,
there is an emerging consensus among scholars of religion in IR, that Constructivism provides one of the most appropriate frameworks with which to capture the international dynamics and impact of the sacred. For instance, leading scholars of religion in IR are applying Constructivist insights to understand and explain the powerful role that religious identities, ideas, agents, and communities play in conflict resolution (Sandal, 2011) , or in structuring the international system (Philpott, 2001 ).
In parallel, Constructivist scholars, less anchored to the above debates on religion in IR, are increasingly using their theoretical frameworks to investigate the normative activity and agency of Islamist movements in Central Asia (Adamson, 2005) , or of humanitarian religious-based actors around the world (Barnett and Stein, 2012; Boesenecker and Vinjamuri, 2011) .
While representing innovative avenues of research, much of this literature, however, tends to borrow and adjust Constructivist frameworks to the specificity of religious agents and ideational dynamics. It is less explicitly geared towards teasing out how social and political research, originating in scholarly debates on religion, can more broadly move forward Constructivist research on international norm dynamics.
In other words, the novelty that religious resurgence processes, and post-secular theorizing may represent, for Constructivism is often left under-explored. We suggest that Habermasian post-secular thinking has the potential to empirically and theoretically expand Constructivist research on cross-cultural norm diffusion and contestation in novel and important ways. We want to be more modest here than proposing the abandonment of old, or the creation of novel, theoretical paradigms when considering the dynamics of religious norms in IR. Yet we also want to be more ambitious than simply absorbing religion into standard IR Constructivist theory. We are proposing a more explicit via media, which we believe is to the mutual benefit of both enterprises.
First, the notion of a post-secular society -when transferred from the domestic to the global realm -broadens the Constructivist horizon towards a greater appreciation and consideration of ideational dynamics, which have been, thus far, under-researched. Namely, processes of religious-based norm diffusion, in westerndominated liberal international contexts, by non-western norm entrepreneurs. Second, the concept of institutional translation used by Habermas in his post-secular writings deepens our knowledge of the mechanisms through which norms are promoted, contested, re-interpreted, and diffused across cultural/normative milieus. Lastly, we believe that this type of re-engagement with Constructivism also benefits scholarship on religion and the post-secular more broadly. It re-energizes attempts to show why, without taking religious dynamics seriously, IR scholars have only a partial view of the international. In fact, even though -or possibly because -over the past decade scholarship on religion has successfully carved out a space for itself in IR, there is a real chance that this research program detaches itself from broader debates in the discipline. We offer one possible way forward to avoid this risk.
Institutional translation: from post-secular normative theory to analytical causal mechanism
In response to religion's political revival over the past decades, Habermas has progressively revised his assumptions about the place of religion in the domestic public sphere of constitutional liberal democracies (Habermas, 2008; Habermas, 2006; Habermas and Mendieta, 2010; Habermas et al., 2010) . He has engaged in a self-reflective process about the 'aggressive secularist' (see also Connolly, 1999) assumptions underlying much contemporary liberal political philosophy, which tends to confine religion to the private sphere. Habermas has come to articulate a normative ideal structured around the possibility of a 'post-secular society', open and inclusive of religions in the public sphere, which facilitates engagement between religious and secular citizens. objective is to provide an updated liberal framework under which religious arguments and perspectives can reasonably re-enter the public sphere, while simultaneously seeking to salvage the strict impartiality of liberal state institutions and its corollary norms of church and state separation.
Habermas' post-secular proposal
To overcome these problems, Habermas narrows the scope of aggressive secularism over politics by introducing an 'institutional translation' proviso. The duty of providing secular translations to religious reasoning in liberal politics does not apply to all citizens, but only to state officials. State 'neutrality', for Habermas (2008: 28) , 'does not preclude the permissibility of religious utterances within the political public sphere'. The separation of church and state, however, does demand that an 'institutional threshold' be kept in place, acting as a 'filter', which allows into the formal proceedings of the state -whether legal deliberations or political decision making -only contributions that can be translated from religious vocabulary into a generally accessible, secular, language (2008: 28; 2006: 10) . Habermas' (2006: 10) institutional translation proviso, hence, would allow religious citizens not 'to split their identity into a public and a private part the moment they participate in public discourses', giving them the chance instead to 'express and justify their convictions in a religious language if they cannot find secular 'translations' for them'.
For Habermas (2006: 17) , 'the contents which reason appropriates through translation must not be lost for faith'. Put differently, the process of institutional translation from religious into secular language is designed to allow the moral intuitions of faith to be accessible also to 'non-believers through the universal language of reason', while at the same time keeping 'the boundaries of knowledge and faith firmly in place' (Mavelli and Petito, 2012: 936) . A successful translation then becomes a precondition for the substantive content of religious voices to be taken up in the agendas and negotiations within political bodies.
For effective translations to occur, both religious and secular actors need to adopt a self-reflective stance that opens up space for mutual learning and cooperation.
Religious citizens ought to recognize that, at the level of state institutions and practices, 'only secular reasons count therein' (Habermas, 2006: 10) and, hence, they should accept that their arguments be translated. Secular citizens must share the burden of translating religious into non-religious reasons. To do so, they should recognize that they 'live in a post-secular society that is epistemically adjusted to the continued existence of religious communities' (Habermas, 2006: 15) . They ought to abandon both secularist readings of modernity as well as laicist understandings of church-state separation, which 'confuse the neutrality of a secular state in view of competing religious worldviews with the purging of the political public sphere of all religious contributions' (Habermas, 2008: 28) . Secular citizens should move beyond 'mere tolerance' (Habermas, 2006: 15) and remain 'agnostic' vis-à-vis religious truthclaims in the public sphere (Habermas, 2006: 17) , in order to enter into genuine dialogue with religious citizens and take religious contributions in politics seriously.
Institutional translation and norm diffusion
We have not surveyed Habermas' proposal in order to make a further intervention in the normative debates that his post-secular thinking has generated.
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We instead wish to employ part of his conceptual toolbox to understand and explain international change. Our premise is that much of Habermas' normative proposal, which he admits is explicitly directed at European laicist states and societies, is already an empirical reality around the world.
Hence, we argue that processes of translation that Habermas posits ought to include post-secular domestic settings, are already taking place at the international level. We are in a 'post-secular world society' (Habermas and Mendieta, 2010 ; see also Barbato and Kratochwil, 2009; Mavelli and Petito, 2012) . 19 This world society is structured around an increasingly pluralist global public sphere, which includes a wide range of religious-based actors and liberal global governance institutions. More specifically we contend that the two presuppositions necessary for effective institutional translations to occur -mutual reflectivity and desire to learn on the part of secular and religious actors -are generally present within the UN system, an institution constitutive of the 'liberal international order' (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999 ).
The UN is a secular institution, but not an aggressive secularist one. It is secular because its goals, activities, and organizational structure are neither religious nor do they subscribe to any religious ethic. It is not aggressive secularist, however, because it's underlying mission and norms are not anti-religious. In fact, the UN has generally been neutral and open towards the public participation of religious groups and communities in its debates and activities. Religious actors and voices have competed, and engaged in dialogue, with secular and secularist actors since the organization's founding moments and, it appears, in ever-growing numbers from the 1990s onwards (Haynes, 2013) .
By taking this analytical perspective we investigate processes where institutional translations -based on a genuine exchange between secular and religious perspectives -are leading to new normative frameworks in the context of the UN system. We move beyond understanding institutional translation as a normative requirement, conceptualizing it instead as a causal mechanism that helps explain how certain religious norms acquire greater traction, becoming institutionalized within the secularized milieu of global governance institutions, while others do not.
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We also build upon, and seek to contribute to, an emerging interest within Constructivist scholarship itself in the processes and mechanisms of norm 'translation' (Boesenecker and Vinjamuri, 2011; Brake and Katzenstein, 2013; Zwingel, 2012; Merry, 2006) . Susanne Zwingel (2012: 124) argues that normative translations require both 'the cultural concepts and the transmitters of these concepts such as language and customs' of the norm promoter, to be converted into 'the language and customs' of the receiving agent's 'system of meaning to enable crosscultural understanding'. This is rarely a one-sided endeavour, but rather 'complicated and open-ended' (2012: 124) . 'Translation', Benjaminn Brake and Peter Katzenstein (2013: 730) similarly contend, 'evokes the uncertainty of the outcome', which is dependent very much on the interaction between different normative systems and their embedded agents.
The concept of translation, hence, underscores the centrality of interaction between culturally situated agents, whereby 'global norm creation and appropriation' unfolds as 'an open process of negotiation' (Zwingel, 2012: 122) . Importantly, we conceptualise this interaction as a dialogical, two-way process, whereby -in Walzerian terms -a 'thicker' culturally situated norm is translated into a 'thinner' norm, which both norm-maker and norm-taker can agree upon. This 'thinning' process echoes Habermas' idea of 'filtering ' (2006: 10; 2008: 28) . Moreover, we argue that a norm that is successfully translated beyond the situated, thicker, normative context in which it originated, is characterized by an open hermeneutic margin for interpretation. As we shall see below, the successful thinning of a norm allows it also to acquire a degree of vagueness and malleability that enables an agreement between the norm-maker and the norm-taker over the norm's meaning and legitimacy, regardless of their cultural/normative divide.
An interest in translation can be seen as part of an emerging third wave of scholarship that seeks to unpack the complex dynamics of cross-cultural norm diffusion. First wave scholarship generally refers to 'persuasion' as the main mechanism through which norms diffuse Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2000) . A norm-maker, generally western-based, persuades the norm-taker, generally non-western, thanks to the power of the 'better argument' or the 'better norm', to adopt the former's liberal normative structure. In some first wave accounts of norm diffusion, this process of persuasion may also rely on the agency of local NGOs that have fully subscribed to liberal norms and therefore contribute to their diffusion in domestic politics . When discussion about the challenges of norm diffusion across cultural contexts features here, this emphasizes mechanisms of persuasion which very much depend on the entrepreneurial skills of the western norm-maker to strategically 'frame' or 'graft' norms in such a way that they 'resonate', 'fit', or 'match' with the norm-taker's local cultural context (see for instance Price, 2003: 596) .
Second wave scholarship has looked more closely at the agency and cultural background of non-western norm-takers. This has led to the identification of mechanisms that, unlike persuasion or fit, capture with greater nuance processes whereby liberal international norms diffuse through cross-cultural reinterpretation. In this context, non-western agents -whether civil society actors, states, or regional organizations -are presented either as active 'mimickers' (Katsumata, 2011) , or selective 'localizers' (Acharya, 2004) and 'vernacularizers' (Levitt and Merry, 2009; Merry, 2006) , or impervious 'resisters' (Kinzelbach, 2013) , of international liberal, cosmopolitan, secular norms.
Compared to first wave scholarship, which theorises mostly one-way processes of persuasion, and attendant practices of grafting and fitting, instead the mechanism of translation puts greater stress, similarly to second wave scholarship, on cross-cultural normative contestation. Translation highlights how norm-takers are not always pristinely socialized or, better, 'converted' 21 into the norm-maker's value structure. Norms, as Zwingel (2012: 126) aptly puts it, are to a large extent 'crossculturally negotiated […] rather than imposed'. In particular, translation captures processes where the norm entrepreneur uses one language and set of meanings, rooted in its own particular cultural and normative milieu (pace fitting), and where the receiving agents, when and if they become socialized in the new norm, internalize it in their own language and set of meanings (pace persuasion). Translation is clearly anchored to a Habermasian logic of argument, yet it does not require and expect agents to change their identities as an outcome of deliberative processes. 
Dialogue of Civilisations
Middle Eastern politics were deeply affected by the global changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, exhausted by a devastating war with Iraq (1980 Iraq ( -1988 and by sustained economic sanctions, at a time of unrivalled American power, the Iranian government increasingly adopted stances that signalled a growing will to normalise relations with western states. This period saw the election of, first, Akbar Ahmed Rafsanjani, and then Muhammad Khatami to the Iranian presidency. Despite being fully committed to the Islamic revolution, both presidents were increasingly concerned with the negative repercussions of Iran's prolonged international isolation and both therefore adopted new foreign policy stances (Ehteshami, 2002) .
Within this context, Khatami put forward the normative proposal for a dialogue of civilisations at the OIC, and later through the OIC to the international community. 24 As conceived by More importantly, though, the norm was grounded in a profound critique of 'end of history' (Fukuyama, 2006) narratives that dominated western discourses at the time. The dialogue of civilisations was understood as a process whereby different cultural and moral views would enjoy equal importance and influence, in contrast to the 'dangerous and destructive claim' (Khatami et al., 2001 ) that world history fulfils itself in an inevitable expansion of western liberalism.
For Khatami (1997) , western civilisation is 'derived from the Greek city-states and the later Roman political system'. Muslim society, instead, has its origin in 'Madinat al-Nabi' (the city of the Prophet), which represents the ideal of civilisation, in Islamic tradition, and marks the passage from the age of 'jāhiliyya' (ignorance) 26 to the age of divine revelation. Only when Muslims are 'secure in their true Islamic identity' can they intervene, as equals, in a genuine dialogue of civilisations (Khatami, 1997) . While acknowledging differences is important, these do not need to spell conflict. The Quranic verse 'East and West belong to God', 27 is seen by Khatami as supporting the notion that all civilisations share the principle of the divine origin of humanity, and therefore are called to cooperate with each other on an equal basis, rather than seeking to dominate each other (Khatami et al., 2001 We argue that institutional translation contributes to explain why the proposal by the Iranian government came to be widely accepted. The reformist leadership of Khatami, and attempts at a US-Iranian détente during the late 1990s, may have played a positive role in the norm's success. Yet, we suggest, an explanation that relies solely on US-Iranian converging interests is incomplete.
US-Iranian rapprochement -which was not only short-lived but also a highly complex and intermittent affair -cannot fully account for the widespread acceptance of the norm by the international community in 1998, and for the norm's capacity to outlive its allegedly favourable historical moment. As some suggest, the US government saw small value in an initiative which did little to advance its direct interests in the region (Tazmini, 2009: 92-97) . Indeed, the US administration at the time was rather lukewarm towards the norm and its representative mostly sat on the margins during the resolution drafting process. It was European policymakers that mostly took the initiative to support a 'thinned' norm, which they recognized as valid from their ethical perspective.
Second, on the occasions when the US and Iran sought to work together -for instance, during the "6 plus 2" UN negotiations on Afghanistan between 1999 to 2001 -this engagement was marked more by diplomatic spats than fruitful cooperation (Wright, 2007) . Yet, despite these unfavourable conditions, the norm promoted by Overall, thanks to the full endorsement of the international community, the dialogue of civilisations norm has become 'settled' (Frost, 1996: 105-112) The condemnation and criminalization of offences towards the sacred, are common phenomena in most religions. The Islamic tradition has its own categories and language. Rushdie was accused of betraying the message of Islam, and therefore committing the sin of ridda (apostasy), which in some interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence can be punished with death. (Kepel, 2002: 186-187; Rehman, 2010) Blasphemy, differently from apostasy, constitutes a more generic offense to the sacredness of Islam and its prophet Muhammad, practiced by non-Muslims (Rehman, 2010) . In line with this interpretation of Islam, several Muslim-majority countries, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt, domestically enforce legislation against blasphemy or apostasy (Rehman and Berry, 2012; Peters and Vries, 1976; O'Sullivan, 2003) .
From the late 1990s, Muslim states sought to advance internationally, in coordination with the OIC, a normative claim to interdict the defamation of Islam, first, and religion, after. The defamation of Islam is understood by the OIC mostly as 'a claim of damage and disrepute being done to Islam.' (Alfandari et al., 2011 ) By styling its normative activity in terms of defamation, the OIC sought to outlaw blasphemy globally. As part of its strategy, the OIC Permanent Observer Mission to the UN would submit draft resolutions in various UN institutional contexts, hoping that these, over time, would become a source of international law. The endeavour turned out to be a failure because the norm faced significant institutional translation barriers. As we shall see, in fact, an explanation that does not look at the failed process of translation, but focuses solely on interests, would not be able to explain fully the observed outcome.
The When Pakistan's delegation on behalf of the OIC proposed at the UNCHR a highly specific norm 'thickly' grounded in the Islamic prohibition of blasphemy (Rehman and Berry, 2012: 444-449) , the members of the international community (Alfandari et al., 2011: 21-26; Kayaoglu, 2012b: 14-19; Langer, 2010) . Despite a series of disagreements (Rehman and Berry, 2012: 440-441 ) -reflecting the contested nature of the norm itself -their work contributed to build an influential body of opinion on defamation that argued against the need for new legal standards. UN officials mostly called on OIC states to replace the focus on 'defamation' with the legal concept of combating 'incitement to national, racial or religious hatred' grounded in international law.
With dwindling international support, in 2011 the member states delegations of the OIC decided to drop their campaign, fearing a negative vote both at the UNGA and the UNHRC. Instead, resolutions 16/18 and 66/167 were adopted by consensus, respectively at the UNHRC and the UNGA, under the title 'combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence, and violence against persons based on religion or belief.' These resolutions were mostly receptive of the requests of western states in previous years, avoided the term defamation, and sanctioned a shift from protecting Islam from criticism, to protecting individuals from discrimination or violence based on religion (Evans, 2011) . No calls were made for legal restrictions on expression, but rather, there were proposals in favour of positive measures to address intolerance and violence based on religion.
Despite reaching an agreement on paper, the OIC has largely seen this as a defeat. That's because its defamation norm was 'lost in translation'. Leaders from OIC countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have repeatedly declared their unchanged commitment to continuing promoting the norm internationally (Goodenough, 2011) . Since 2011, the OIC has pursued several initiatives on defamation within its membership and outside the purview of the UN (Rehman and Berry, 2012: 450-453 
Conclusion
This article has drawn on the insights of Habermasian post-secular theory, in order to move IR Constructivist research on norm dynamics beyond its current western-centric focus. We have sought to broaden this research agenda, by investigating the dynamics of religious-based norms, promoted by non-western normmakers, within the institutional structures of the international liberal order. To this end, we have conceptualized institutional translation as a key mechanism that contributes to explain the success or failure of contentious cross-cultural processes of norm diffusion.
We have defined institutional translation as a process whereby normative claims, situated in a 'thick' particular value system, are rephrased through a dialogical process into a 'thinner', more general, and universal idiom within an institutional context. When institutional translation is successful, the process establishes an open hermeneutic margin, which allows the norm to be interpreted and acknowledged as legitimate from multiple ethical perspectives. We understand translation as different from, but also complementary to, previous research on mechanisms of norm diffusion.
Early, first wave literature, unpacks the 'persuasive' power of liberal, western normmakers in converting norm-takers into the former's value system. Second wave literature critiques accounts of persuasion by highlighting instead the creative agency of culturally situated non-western, norm-takers in processes of normative 'adaptation', 'localization' and 'vernacularization'.
Compared to persuasion, institutional translation emphasizes how normative consensus can be reached without actors needing to change their identities as an outcome of norm diffusion. Differently from second wave literature, institutional translation is agnostic about the direction in which norms travel, and sees non-western agents also as active global norm-makers and not only as local norm-takers. Overall, the concept of institutional translation helps to explain when and how norms that originate outside of the liberal tradition diffuse internationally, hence shedding light on important normative dynamics that remain largely under-investigated.
To make the case for less western-centric research on norm dynamics and the explanatory value of institutional translation, this study analysed the contrasting cases of diffusion of two Islamic-based norms promoted globally by the OIC: the dialogue of civilizations and the defamation of religions. We traced how, in the case of the dialogue of civilization, the claims in support of the norm from Iran's government and the OIC's observer mission to the UN went through a successful process of institutional translation, allowing the norm to become diffused and institutionalized in the UN system. This occurred because a 'thinning' of the norm was possible, without loosing its original meaning for OIC states' representatives, while also allowing non-OIC states' delegations to recognize the norm's legitimacy from their own distinct cultural perspectives. This was not an instance of persuasion, since no socialization/conversion to Islam was required by non-Muslim states, nor was it necessary for the UNGA to endorse Islamic principles.
We show how Khatami and the OIC proposed the dialogue of civilization in a historical period marked by an opening of Iran towards the West. However, we also
show that the fate of the dialogue initiative was only marginally dependent on this context. In fact, an Iran-West rapprochement was far from an obvious reality at the beginning of the normative process, and became impossible after 2001, when the dialogue of civilisations norm became ever more embedded within the structures of the UN system. We find, then, that institutional translation provides a more comprehensive explanatory account than one that takes into consideration solely contingent political calculations.
The second example presented a case of non-diffusion due to a failed process of institutional translation. Multiple dialogical attempts between the OIC and Western states and UN officials took place for over a decade (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) in an effort to translate the Islamic prohibition against defamation, based on notions of blasphemy and apostasy. Yet, the parties were unable to reach a common agreement on the legitimacy of the norm from both Islamic and secular, liberal, perspectives. The obstacle in establishing an open hermeneutic margin, we argued, was a crucial factor that hindered the OIC's ability to diffuse the norm against defamation globally.
In fact, this occurred despite a favourable historical and political context, where western representatives did have multiple incentives to work with the OIC to pass a similar norm. First, western leaders were well aware that they needed to avoid, in the context of the War on Terror, the perception that they were engaged in a war against Islam. Second, western delegations did, in fact, consider and then would promote resolutions aimed at fostering religious tolerance. Third, compared to the dialogue of civilization, which was largely promoted by Iran and the OIC under Khatami's leadership, norms against defamation were advanced through the OIC by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, countries with closer ties to the West than Iran. The nondiffusion of this norm was not an epiphenomenon incidental to broader political dynamics but is more comprehensively explained as the result of a failed translation.
We acknowledge that, on the basis of only two examples, it is difficult to make generalisations. Yet, we hope that we have begun to show how attention to processes of institutional translation has the potential to capture dynamics of norms contestation and diffusion across diverse culturally situated normative actors, until now generally overlooked. The hope is to foster a research agenda more sensitive towards understanding and explaining the emerging patterns of international change of an increasingly culturally diverse multipolar world society.
